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Notes and Comments
Patronage and Public Employment After
Branti v. Finkel
I. Introduction
The constitutionality of patronage practices' in public em-
ployment, specifically dismissals, has been questioned in recent
years.' Political parties' use of the spoils system to staff govern-
ment positions was severely restricted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Branti v. Finkel.' The Branti Court held that party
affiliation is an appropriate dismissal criterion only if allegiance
to a particular political party is necessary for effective perform-
ance of the public office involved.' Applying this test, the Court
held that two Republican assistant public defenders were de-
prived of their First and Fourteenth Amendment 5 rights when
1. Patronage practices include:
placing loyal supporters in government jobs that may or may not have been made
available by political discharges. Nonofficeholders may be the beneficiaries of lu-
crative government contracts. . . . Favored wards may receive improved public
services.
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976).
In Elrod, public employees were threatened with dismissal to make way for pa-
tronage appointments. They could avoid dismissal only if they joined the party in power,
campaigned for that party's candidates and contributed a portion of their salaries to the
party. Obtaining the sponsorship of a powerful party member would also preserve one's
employment, but sponsorship generally followed the actions outlined above. Id. at 355.
In Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court examined a less coercive system.
In Branti, adherents of the losing party were simply terminated; they were not asked or
expected to shift their allegiance. Id. at 516.
2. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657
(W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978).
3. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
4. Id. at 518.
5. The First Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment provides,
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
U.S. CONSr. amend. XIV.
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fired by the newly-appointed Democratic public defender solely
because of their political beliefs.'
Respondents Finkel and Tabakman were appointed as assis-
tant public defenders in Rockland County, New York, in 1971
and 1975 respectively.7 Assistant public defenders traditionally
serve at the pleasure of the public defender, who is in turn ap-
pointed for a term of six years by the county legislature.8 In
1977, control of the legislature shifted from the Republicans to
the Democrats. Branti, a Democrat, was appointed in 1978 to
replace the incumbent Republican public defender whose term
had expired.'
Immediately after Branti's appointment, he began executing
termination notices for six of the nine assistants who had served
under his Republican predecessor.10 Finkel and Tabakman, both
Republicans, were among this group. Respondents commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York to enjoin Branti from terminating their
employment on the sole grounds of their political beliefs.1" The
6. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 520 (1980).
7. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1284-85.
10. Other than respondents, two Democrats and two Republicans were not reap-
pointed. Id. n. 2.
The nine replacement appointees, their party affiliation and the manner in which
their names were submitted are as follows:
1. John Allison, Democrat, submitted by Clarkstown delegation of the
legislature.
2. Lorna Bernard, Democrat, submitted by Democratic chairman of Orangetown.
3. Gerard Blumenfeld, Democrat, submitted by Chairperson of Rockland County
Democratic Committee.
4. John Costa, Democrat, submitted by Clarkstown delegation of the legislature.
5. Wayne Feinberg, Democrat, submitted by Stony Point delegation of the
legislature.
6. John McAlevey, Democrat, submitted by Ramapo delegation of the
legislature.
7. John McCabe, Democrat, submitted by a legislator from Haverstraw.
8. William Nelson, Democrat, submitted by Clarkstown delegation of the
legislature.
9. Manuel Sanchez, no party affiliation, reappointed because of his ability to
speak Spanish.
Id. at 1287 & n. 8.
11. Id. at 1285. Jurisdiction was predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) (1976). Id. n. 3.
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district court granted the injunction, 12 relying on Elrod v.
Burns,'5 which held that a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential
public employee could not be discharged based solely on his po-
litical beliefs." On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily affirmed the district court's action.15 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari1 and affirmed in a six-to-three deci-
sion.17 In reaching its decision, the Court formulated a revised
standard for determining the constitutionality of patronage
dismissals."'
This note, in its examination of Branti v. Finkel, focuses on
the Court's expansion of the Elrod"9 doctrine. Following an ex-
ploration of prior case law and an analysis of the Branti opin-
ions, this note concludes that the decision and the attendant
curtailment of patronage is constitutionally justified. It predicts
that the Branti standard2 0 will be extended to other patronage
employment practices, but that the vagueness of the standard
will result in confusion in its application.
II. Background
A. Previous Case Law
The practice of dismissing employees when the party in
power changes violates the protection of political activity long
recognized as a part of the First Amendment. The Court has
12. Id. at 1293. The order directed Branti to permit Finkel and Tabakman to work
as assistant public defenders and to pay them normal assistants' salaries. Merely paying
plaintiffs' wages would not satisfy the order. Id. at 1285 n. 4.
13. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
14. Id. at 375 (Stewart & Blackmun JJ., concurring). The district court accepted
this statement as the rule to be applied. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1289
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
15. Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (memorandum opinion, unpub-
lished opinion of the court reproduced in the Appendix to petitioner's Petition for
Certiorari).
16. Branti v. Finkel, 443 U.S. 904 (1979).
17. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Justice Stevens wrote the majority opin-
ion, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun
joined. Id. at 508. Justice Stewart filed a dissent, as did Justice Powell. Id. at 520-21.
Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's dissent, and Justice Stewart joined in Part I
of Justice Powell's dissent. Id. at 521.
18. Id. at 518.
19. See notes 13 & 14 and accompanying text supra.
20. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
19811
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held repeatedly that freedom of speech includes the right to
work for the advancement of political ideals."1 This right encom-
passes a broad range of political activity.22 The Court has noted
that "[tihe First Amendment protects political association as
well as political expression,' and in Kusper v. Pontikes,4 the
Court specifically recognized the right to affiliate with one's cho-
sen political party.'5
The Court may view a violation of these political freedoms
as either direct or indirect. In some instances the same action
may cause both an indirect and a direct infringement.26 A direct
infringement results if the complained of action "compels or re-
strains belief [or] association.' 7 An indirect infringement results
21. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). Justice Harlan wrote, "It is be-
yond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of ... freedom of speech. It is immaterial whether the
beliefs sought to be advanced pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters.
.. ." Id. At issue in that case was Alabama's demand, during injunction proceedings to
stop NAACP activity in the state, for a membership list. The Court held the demand
unconstitutional. Id. at 466.
22. The Court has
relied on the right of association guaranteed by the First Amendment in holding
that state action which denies individuals the freedom to form groups for the ad-
vancement of political ideas, as well as the freedom to campaign and vote for the
candidates chosen by those groups, is unconstitutional absent a strong subordinat-
ing interest.
Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d. 825, 828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976)); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972);
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967) (association rights of Communist Party members); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952) (loyalty oath denying past Communist associations held unconstitutional).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
24. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
25. Id. at 56-57.
26. In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), the patronage practices described in note
1 supra had both indirect and direct effects. To the extent that these practices en-
couraged employees to compromise their beliefs and to pretend adherance to the party in
power, the effect was direct. Id. at 357. If the employee did not bow before the threat of
dismissal, his exercise of First Amendment rights was penalized, and the effect was indi-
rect. Id. at 359.
In Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960), teachers disputed the validity of a state
statute which required them to disclose, in an annual affidavit, all organizations to which
they belonged or contributed. In requiring disclosure of associational ties, the statute
directly impaired the teacher's rights of free association. Id. at 490. If a teacher avoided
those ties which "might displease those who control[led] his professional destiny ... "
the infringement on constitutionally protected rights was indirect. Id. at 486.
27. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976).
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when the behaviors and attitudes which the government intends
should prevail are impelled by roundabout means.2 8 Thus, re-
ceipt of a public benefit may not be conditioned, as a reward, on
an individual's relinquishment of his constitutionally protected
rights.2 9
When the Court discovers either a direct or an indirect in-
fringement of protected political rights, the standard it employs
is strict scrutiny. 0 Most, but not all, violations will be held un-
constitutional; "the prohibition on encroachment of First
Amendment protections is not an absolute. Restraints are per-
mitted for appropriate reasons."' The formulation which the
Court uses in measuring the appropriateness of a government's
reasons is stated variously from case to case. While in one case
the Court asks that the "State come. . . forward with sufficient
proof to justify" its action, 2 in another it inquires whether the
means employed "broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved."33 The Court may
require that the State's interest be compelling" to balance the
individual's loss of freedom. No matter how the Court formu-
lates the standard, the burden is on the government to show
that it has met the standard articulated. 5
The Supreme Court first applied these standards to the
question of patronage dismissals in Elrod v. Burns.3 6 In that
case, the Court evaluated the traditional prerogative of the
newly-elected sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, to replace non-
28. The government may not act to "produce a result which [it] could not command
directly." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
29. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
30. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 464-
65 (1958).
31. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976).
32. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
463 (1958).
33. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
34. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
35. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
36. Id. The Court had denied review in two previous cases involving similar facts:
Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973); and Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
19811
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civil service employees who did not win the support of his
party.37
In an opinion which failed to command a majority, 8 Justice
Brennan declared that patronage, to the extent that it compels
or restrains belief, is inimical to the Constitution.3 He stated:
In short, if conditioning the retention of public employment on
the employee's support of the in-party is to survive constitutional
challenge, it must further some vital government end by a means
that is least restrictive of freedom of belief and association in
achieving that end, and the benefit gained must outweigh the loss
of constitutionally protected rights.40
Justice Brennan would have limited permissible patronage dis-
missals to employees in policymaking positions,41 whom he de-
scribed as having "responsibilities that are not well-defined or
are of broad scope.' 42
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Stewart restated the
issue as "whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential govern-
ment employee can be discharged or threatened with discharge
from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole
ground of his political beliefs. '43 He and Justice Blackmun
37. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1976). The plaintiffs were four employees:
a process server, a chief deputy of the process division, a bailiff and security guard, and
one other. All were members of the Republican party when the new sheriff, a Democrat,
took office. Three were dismissed, and the fourth was threatened with dismissal, because
they were not members of the Democratic Party and had failed to obtain the sponsor-
ship of a party member. Id. at 350-51. For a discussion of the means by which these
employees might have obtained sponsorship, see note 1 supra.
38. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opin-
ion, in which Justices White and Marshall joined. Id. at 349. Justice Stewart wrote a
concurring opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined. Id. at 374. Chief Justice Burger
dissented separately, id. at 375, and joined in another dissent written by Justice Powell
and also joined by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 376.
39. Id. at 357.
40. Id. at 363. Justice Brennan noted that, in determining whether a vital govern-
ment end was furthered, "care must be taken not to confuse the interest of partisan
organizations with governmental interests." Id. at 362.
41. Id. at 367, 372.
42. Id. at 368. Justice Brennan stated, "No clear line can be drawn between poli-
cymaking and nonpolicymaking positions." Id. at 367. Instead, this issue was to be
treated, on remand, as a question of fact on which the state had the burden of proof. Id.
at 368.
43. Id. at 374, 375. (Stewart, J., concurring).
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agreed that such an individual cannot be dismissed." This re-
statement of the case has been cited by other courts as the Elrod
Court's holding."
Neither the plurality nor the concurrence suggested that the
employees had a protected right to retain their government jobs
or that the employees were entitled to a due process hearing
before they could be dismissed.46 Rather, the Court relied on
Keyshian v. Board of Regents47 and Perry v. Sindermann,48
which held that a public employee who had no contractual right
to his job nonetheless could not be dismissed for engaging in
constitutionally protected speech.49 Therefore, the dismissed pa-
tronage employee need not show even the expectation of contin-
ued employment.
The dismissed employee must, however, demonstrate that
his political beliefs were the sole cause of his discharge.50 If he
fails to do so, or if his former employer succeeds in controverting
his proofs on this issue, Mt. Healthy Board of Education v.
Doyle"1 would deny him relief. In Mt. Healthy, the Court held
that
the fact that the protected conduct played a "substantial part" in
the actual decision not to renew would [not] necessarily amount
to a constitutional violation justifying remedial action .... The
constitutional principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such
an employee is placed in no worse a position than if he had not
engaged in the conduct."'
A government can therefore escape liability to a discharged em-
ployee if it can show that he would have been terminated on
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See notes 53-55
and accompanying text infra.
46. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1976).
47. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
48. 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) ("[There are some reasons upon which the government
may not rely.").
49. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); Keyshian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
50. See Justice Stewart's formulation of the issue, text accompanying note 43 supra.
51. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, a teacher's contract was not renewed after
the teacher had been involved in several incidents which showed a lack of maturity and
judgment; he also had criticized the school administration publicly. Id.
52. Id. at 285-86.
1981]
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other grounds.
In the four years between the Elrod and Branti decisions,
lower federal courts had many opportunities to deal with the is-
sues raised by patronage dismissal of public employees. These
courts generally viewed Justice Stewart's restatement of the is-
sue as the holding of Elrod.3 Many of these cases cite Marks v.
United States5" as the basis for their conclusion that the plural-
ity's statement of the case must be taken as its holding.55 Ac-
cordingly, the courts inquired whether the plaintiff before them
was a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential employee and, there-
fore, protected from politically motivated dismissal under
Elrod.5"
Courts were less certain, however, whether a particular em-
ployee functioned as a policymaker or a confidential employee.
In Ramey v. Harber,57 the district court noted that "the term
'policymaker' presents an elusive factual question. . . . Obvi-
ously, the term may assume different connotations in different
forms of employment." 8 Justice Brennan's definition of a poli-
cymaker as one with broad responsibilities and ill-defined objec-
tives5' has often been cited as the starting point of a full inquiry
into the nature of a specific position.60
53. "[Mlost judicial interpretations of Elrod have found that a policymaking, confi-
dential employee can be discharged from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon
the sole ground of his political beliefs." Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1034 (5th
Cir. 1979).
54. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). In Marks, the Court held that
[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.. .. "
Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976)) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell and Stevens, JJ.).
55. See, e.g., Davis v. Williams, 598 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 49
U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 20, 1980); Alfaro de Quevedo v. De Jesus Schuck, 556 F.2d 591
(1st Cir. 1977); Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
56. Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833, 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
57. 431 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Va. 1977), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753 (4th
Cir. 1978).
58. Id. at 666 n. 15.
59. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976). See note 42 and accompanying text
supra.
60. See, e.g., Committee to Protect the First Amend. Rights of Employees of the
Dep't of Agriculture v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 875, 878-79 (D.D.C. 1979), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 3012 (1980); Stegmaier v. Trammell, 597 F.2d 1027, 1035 (5th Cir.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/11
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In pursuing their inquiries, courts have examined civil ser-
vice statutes,61 statutes creating the government positions,62 and
the day-to-day responsibilities of the employees.63 In Committee
to Protect the First Amendment Rights of Employees of the
Department of Agriculture v. Bergland,64 the court of appeals
held that a Civil Service Commission classification of a particu-
lar position as nonpolicymaking did not end the inquiry.6 5
Rather, it was one factor of many to be considered;6 6 in deter-
mining constitutional rights, the court refused to be bound by
an administrative determination, the correctness of which it
questioned. A court must consider all available information in
deciding whether a position involves policymaking.
Courts have had to grope for the intended meaning of "non-
confidential" in Elrod. Justice Brennan did not discuss confiden-
1979). In Davis v. Williams, 598 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3289
(U.S. Oct. 20, 1980), Judge Rubin called for the establishment of guidelines to clarify the
responsibilities of public employees and to protect their rights. Id. at 921.
61. See, e.g., Committee to Protect the First Amend. Rights of Employees of the
Dep't of Agriculture v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 875 (D.C.C. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 3012 (1980); Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 445
U.S. 507 (1980).
62. See, e.g., Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 968 (1977); Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
63. See, e.g., Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833, 837-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Ramey v.
Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 666 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
64. 626 F.2d 875 (D.C.C. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 3012 (1980).
65. Id. at 879. In Committee to Protect, former Department of Agriculture employ-
ees, who had been dismissed from positions as state directors of the Farmers Home Ad-
ministration and state executive directors of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conserva-
tion Service, sought the protection of Elrod. Their employment had been terminated,
allegedly on partisan political grounds, shortly after President Carter took office.
Secretary Bergland contended that Elrod's protections were unavailable to these for-
mer employees because they were policymakers. Id. at 876-78. The district court and the
court of appeals agreed "that the positions occupied by the members of appellant's group
were policymaking and therefore the discharge of the incumbents did not infringe upon
their constitutional rights." Id. at 881.
66. Id. at 880. "[W]e, of course, take into consideration the determination of the
Civil Service Commission." Id.
67. Id. at 879 & n. 14. The court reported several Civil Service Commission classifi-
cations with which the court disagreed, noting that "there are substantial numbers of
attorneys in government service classified as Schedule A [not policymaking or confiden-
tial]." Id. at 880. Instead, to reach its determination, the court examined published job
descriptions, the testimony of witnesses and plaintiffs, and the general nature of the
positions. Id. at 879.
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tiality, except to note that considerations of "loyalty of employ-
ees" are "inadequate to validate patronage wholesale."6 8 Neither
does Justice Stewart offer an explanation of "nonconfidential" in
his concurrence.6 9 Thus, one of the elements of Elrod's holding,
as accepted by the lower courts, was never defined by Elrod
itself. 70
In their search for the Elrod Court's intent, courts have
looked in two distinct directions. At least one court has given
"nonconfidential" an independent meaning, unrelated to the
policymaking process. In Stegmaier v. Trammell,71 the court
held that
[w]hen, by statute, a deputy clerk is empowered to conduct all
business which the clerk is authorized to conduct, . . . and when,
by statute, the clerk is subject to civil liability and fines for fail-
ure to perform his statutory duty, . . . [he] must be afforded the
opportunity to select his single deputy clerk; he must be able to
select a deputy in whom he has total trust and confidence and
from whom he can expect, without question, undivided loyalty.
72
This court seems to view "confidential" in the sense of confi-
dence in the employee's competence, ability and willingness to
68. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976). Presumably, Justice Brennan would
allow individual firings of employees who were shown to be disloyal. He stated,
"[E]mployees may always be discharged for good cause, such as insubordination or poor
job performance, when those bases in fact exist." Id. at 366.
69. Id. at 375. Apparently Justice Stewart would not require that a government wait
until a confidential employee disclosed privileged material before dismissing that em-
ployee in favor of one whose loyalty is known.
70. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Patronage Firings, 90 HARv. L. REV. 186,
194 & n. 41 (1976).
Certainly elected officials should be permitted to dismiss their predecessors' per-
sonal secretaries and a few others who work closely with such officials in positions
requiring a relationship of mutual trust. However, courts should construe the ex-
ception narrowly and guard against efforts to invoke it in support of across-the-
board patronage dismissals.
Id. at 194 n. 41. Justice Stevens, when he served on the court of appeals, mentioned
"considerations of personal loyalty" as a possible justification of patronage in a decision
otherwise condemning patronage dismissals. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34
v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561, 574 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973).
71. 597 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1979). In Stegmaier, the court first found that the dis-
charged deputy circuit clerk could not be a policymaker since the circuit clerk was not.
Id. at 1034-35. The court then determined that the deputy circuit clerk was a confiden-
tial employee and thus outside the protections of Elrod. Id. at 1040.
72. Id. at 1040.
[Vol. 1:423
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do the job. 73 Other courts have probed whether the employee's
job responsibilities included preserving the employer's secrets. 7
In Ramey v. Harber," the court noted that the employer "did
not confide in his deputies in matters of general administrative
operation and policy formulation. ' '7' These courts have shaped
the definition of "confidential" to protect the integrity of the
policymaking process.
The lower courts have not responded consistently, under ei-
ther a nonpolicymaking or a nonconfidential analysis, to cases
involving attorneys as employees. While some courts have been
willing to examine critically the responsibilities of the individual
employee,77 others have adopted a broader view of the implica-
tions of the attorney-client relationship.78 No court has faced the
issue squarely; these latter courts would, apparently, hold that
no government-employed attorney could claim the protections of
Elrod.
A final aspect of Elrod which has led to confusion in the
lower courts has been its applicability to patronage practices
which do not amount to firings or dismissals. The Elrod plural-
ity, while less than clear on this issue, condemned a broad range
of patronage practices and would seemingly have been willing to
73. The court of appeals used similar language to discuss the relationship of em-
ployee and employer in Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825, 830 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 968 (1977). The Newcomb case was decided on the basis of the employee's role
as a policynaker. Id. at 829. The court, therefore, did not articulate the constitutional
significance of the employer's need to have "confidence in his deputy," id. at 830, nor did
the court indicate whether that interest alone would have been sufficient to justify the
employee's discharge.
74. See, e.g., Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833, 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Ramey v.
Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 666 (W.D. Va. 1977), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
75. 431 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Va. 1977), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
76. Id. at 666.
77. Newcomb v. Brennan, 558 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977).
While the Newcomb court held that plaintiff, a deputy city attorney, was a policymaker,
it did so only after a detailed examination of his position, which the court found to be
significantly different from that of a lesser attorney in the same office. Id. at 829.
78. See Committee to Protect the First Amend. Rights of Employees of the Dep't of
Agriculture v. Bergland, 626 F.2d 875, 880 (D.C.C. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100
S. Ct. 3012 (1980), quoted at note 67 supra. In Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833
(E.D.N.Y. 1979), the court upheld the dismissal of a county attorney; the court noted
that "[Tihe confidential relationship between an attorney and his client is based on
trust." Id. at 838.
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find many of these activities unconstitutional.7" The concurring
justices were explicit in their limitation of the issue to dismis-
sals.80 This has led to speculation on the part of courts and com-
mentators.81 In the courts, this lack of clarity has been most
acutely felt in cases involving a failure to rehire or reappoint an
employee whose term in office has expired.8s In Ramey v.
Harber,83 the district court discussed this issue at length:
The mere fact that plaintiffs had no vested right to reappoint-
ment cannot be dispositive of their claim of constitutional in-
fringement. On several occasions, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that a nontenured school teacher could not be
denied contract renewal solely because of the teacher's exercise of
rights protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
. ..[Plotential for abuse of First Amendment freedoms is accen-
tuated when the decision as to reappointment is totally within the
discretion of the appointing authority."
The court concluded that the existence of an expectation of re-
appointment or continued employment is immaterial when the
behavior complained of violates First Amendment rights.8 "
As shown above, the lower courts had not achieved consen-
sus on the reach and application of Elrod. Beyond the confusion
discussed above, courts disagreed on the issue of the Elrod doc-
trine's retroactive application," and at least one federal judge
indicated his belief that Elrod applied only if "the infringement
79. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976). See Will The Victor Be Denied The
Spoils? Constitutional Challenges To Patronage Dismissals, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
165, 183 (1977).
80. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 374 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring).
81. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Patronage Firings, 90 HARV. L. REV. 186,
194-96 (1976); Will The Victor Be Denied The Spoils? Constitutional Challenges To
Patronage Dismissals, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 183-85 (1977).
82. See, e.g., Ramey v. Hrber, 589 F.2d 753, 757 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 910 (1979) ("[T]here is considerable uncertainty as to how a majority of the Su-
preme Court would treat a failure to rehire and other patronage practices."); Reed v.
Hamblen County, 468 F. Supp. 2 (1978).
83. 431 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Va. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753 (4th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
84. Id. at 663 (citations omitted).
85. Id. at 664.
86. See Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 667-70 (W.D. Va. 1977) (applied retro-
actively), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 753, 757-60 (4th Cir. 1978) (denied retro-
active application), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979).
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of first amendment rights was direct and immediate, not indirect
and speculative. 87 Such a broad array of views is represented in
the lower courts' interpretations of Elrod that a court, facing a
claim that a government employee's discharge was politically
motivated, could find valid support for almost any determina-
tion. This uncertainty indicated a need for reinterpretation or
clarification of Elrod which the Supreme Court met by its grant
of certiorari in Branti v. Finkel."
B. Branti v. Finkel: The Decision Below
In Finkel v. Branti,s9 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York relied on the Elrod doctrine
to maintain Finkel and Tabakman as assistant public defenders
for Rockland County. Plaintiffs commenced the action to enjoin
Branti from terminating their employment or otherwise altering
their employment status. Plaintiffs asserted that as nonpoli-
cymaking, nonconfidential public employees satisfactorily per-
forming their jobs, they could not be denied employment solely
because of their party affiliation.90 Judge Broderick accepted the
plaintiff's characterization of the issues and found their claim
meritorious." The court, therefore, enjoined Branti from termi-
nating Finkel's and Tabakman's employment solely because of
their political beliefs.
The court concluded that the injunction must issue irre-
spective of whether the Elrod plurality or concurrence was con-
sidered the rule of that case." Judge Broderick applied the tests
of Justice Stewart's concurrence against the allegations of Finkel
and Tabakman. 93 To determine whether plaintiffs occupied poli-
87. Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1978)(K.K. Hall, J., dissenting).
88. 434 U.S. 908 (1979). Perhaps the court granted certiorari in Branti after denying
review to Newcomb v. Brennan, 434 U.S. 968 (1977), Ramey v. Harber, 442 U.S. 910
(1979), and Committee to Protect the First Amend. Rights of Employees of the Dep't of
Agriculture v. Bergland, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 3012 (1980), because Branti presents a
broader range of post-Elrod issues without procedural complications.
89. 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90. Id. at 1285. Prior to his dismissal Finkel had changed his party registration from
Republican to Democrat in hopes of attaining the sponsorship of the Democratic caucus.
All parties continued to regard Finkel as a Republican during the period at issue.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1289.
93. Id. at 1290.
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cymaking positions, the court analyzed their duties in relation to
the standard enunciated by the Elrod plurality - "whether the
employee acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the imple-
mentation of broad goals. '94 The court ruled that the plaintiffs
did not make policy with respect to the management of the pub-
lic defender's office, nor did they "act as advisor or formulate
plans for the implementation of the broad goals of the office."'95
Turning to the confidentiality issue, Judge Broderick stated that
a confidential employee is one who stands in a relationship of
trust to a policymaker or has access to confidential documents or
materials used in the policymaking process. 6 He determined
that the existence of confidential relations between plaintiffs
and their clients did not bring Finkel and Tabakman in confi-
dential contact with the policymaking process of the public de-
fender's office.97
The court found that Finkel and Tabakman had performed
their jobs satisfactorily prior to dismissal. Judge Broderick re-
lied primarily on the assessment of Branti's predecessor, Frank
Barone, for an evaluation of the plaintiff's competence. Barone
considered Finkel and Tabakman adequate in their jobs and in-
dicated he would have reappointed them had he remained as
public defender.9 8 While serving in the capacity of assistant dis-
trict attorney, Branti also noted that Finkel and Tabakman were
competent attorneys. 99
Having determined that plaintiffs were satisfactorily per-
forming their jobs, the court concluded that the only rationale
for their discharge was that they belonged to the wrong party.100
Elrod, therefore, commanded that Finkel and Tabakman be al-
94. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976). See note 42 and accompanying text
supra.
95. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
96. Id. He thus joined in the interpretation of confidentiality espoused by the 4th
Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra.
97. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
98. Id.
99. At a second set of hearings on the issue, Branti stated that he no longer re-
garded Tabakman and Finkel as competent. Judge Broderick chose not to credit this
testimony. Id. at n. 11.
100. Branti failed to offer any substantial nonpolitical grounds to support the dis-
charge of plaintiffs. Id. at 1292.
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lowed to retain their jobs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
unanimously affirmed the decision of the district court 0' and
ruled that "under Elrod . . .appellees are entitled to the relief
granted by the District Court."'0 2 Branti argued on appeal that
he had valid nonpolitical reasons for discharging appellees, and,
thus, the district court's holding should be reversed on the
strength of Mt. Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle. 10  The
court determined that the district court's findings of facts were
not clearly erroneous and, therefore, must stand. Accordingly,
Mt. Healthy was held inapplicable.' 0'
Branti also alleged that appellees occupied policymaking
positions and were not protected by the Elrod doctrine.' 05 He
claimed that since the position of assistant public defender was
an exempt position under the New York Civil Service Law, 06 it
followed that the position must be policymaking or confidential.
The court disagreed. It found no connection between the classifi-
cation of a position as exempt and that post's relation to confi-
dentiality or the policymaking process. The court reasoned that
the exempt classification merely reflected the judgment of the
legislature that civil service examinations were inappropriate for
filling such positions and had nothing to do with the confidential
or policymaking nature of the job.10 7
III. Branti v. Finkel: The Decision
A. The Majority
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district
101. Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979)(memorandum opinion, unpub-
lished opinion of the court reproduced in the Appendix to petitioner's Petition for
Certiorari).
102. Id. at 2a.
103. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See notes 51-52 and accompanying text supra.
104. Finkel v. Branti, No. 78-7494 (2d Cir. filed Feb. 20, 1979), unpublished opinion
of the court reproduced in the Appendix to petitioner's Petition for Certiorari, at 3a.
105. Id.
106. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 75 (McKinney 1977).
107. Finkel v. Branti, No. 78-7494 (2d Cir. filed Feb. 20, 1979), unpublished opinion
of the court reproduced in the Appendix to petitioner's Petition for Certiorari, at 3a-4a.
The District of Columbia Circuit has employed similar reasoning. See notes 64-67 and
accompanying text supra.
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court and court of appeals holding that Finkel and Tabakman
were entitled to retain their jobs. s08 The Court, in so doing, de-
parted from the standards enunciated in Elrod and formulated a
new test to gauge the propriety of patronage dismissals. Justice
Stevens,109 writing for the majority, " ° stated that "the ultimate
inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential'
fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hir-
ing authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appro-
priate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved." '
Petitioner Branti had advanced four arguments for reversal.
First, he contended the action should have been dismissed since
he would have discharged Finkel and Tabakman for incompe-
tence." 2 Second, Branti argued that the case be treated not as a
dismissal, but as a failure to reappoint; he therefore urged the
Court to apply a less stringent standard. " Third, he asserted
that the Elrod doctrine should be limited to its facts; Branti al-
leged that Elrod applied only if government employees were co-
erced into pledging allegiance to a political party that they
would not voluntarily support, not to a requirement that an em-
ployee be sponsored by the party in power.11 4 Finally, Branti
contended that while party sponsorship may be an unconstitu-
tional condition for continued employment of certain ministerial
workers, it was an acceptable criterion for employment of assis-
tant public defenders.115
Petitioner's first two arguments were summarily rejected by
108. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 520 (1980).
109. Justice Stevens had, during his term on the court of appeals, indicated a dis-
taste for patronage. In Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1973), he wrote that patronage "is actually at
war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment." Id. at
576.
110. For the division of the court, see note 17 supra.
111. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
112. Id. at 512 n. 6. This was petitioner's Mt. Healthy claim. See text accompanying
notes 50-52 supra.
113. Id. See notes 79-84 and accompanying text supra.
114. Id. at 512. Petitioner argued that Elrod applied to a direct infringement of
First Amendment rights, but not to an indirect violation. See notes 26-29 and accompa-
nying text supra. Branti was not alone in making this argument. See note 87 and accom-
panying text supra.
115. Id.
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the Court. " Regarding the incompetence issue, Justice Stevens
stated that the district court's findings of fact were adequately
supported by the record, and further review of them was inap-
propriate.11 7 Commenting on failure to reappoint, the Court
noted that mere "lack of a reasonable expectation of continued
employment is not sufficient to justify a dismissal based solely
on an employee's private political beliefs."118
The Court gave greater consideration to Petitioner's third
argument, but refused to limit the application of Elrod to those
cases in which government employees were coerced into adopt-
ing prescribed political beliefs. Justice Stevens asserted that
such an interpretation would emasculate the principles set forth
in that decision. He argued that if Elrod were limited to only the
prohibition of blatant coercion, it would not protect against the
more subtle "coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the
knowledge that one must have a sponsor in the dominant party
in order to retain one's job."119 The Court noted that this effect
was apparent in Finkel's futile attempt to save his job by chang-
ing his party registration. 12  The Court held that "there is no
requirement that dismissed employees prove they. . . [were] co-
erced into changing, either actually or ostensibly, their political
allegiance.' 2 1 Victims of patronage dismissal need only establish
that they were fired solely because of their party affiliation or
political beliefs.122
Like the Elrod plurality, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment protects a public employee from discharge based on
116. Id. n. 6.
117. Id.
118. Id. Both Petitioner and Respondent argued the application of Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Branti stated that Finkel and Tabakman "had no rea-
sonable expectation of being retained .. " Brief for Petitioner at 8. Respondents coun-
tered, alleging that "even in the absence of the continuing employment expectation, the
refusal to hire those who possessed all requisite qualifications except the right political
posture ... would be violative of the First Amendment." Brief for Respondent at 10. In
his reply brief, at 3, Branti answered, "there was no such implied contract, respondents
had no objective expectancy of re-employment." The Court indicated that the presence
or absence of the expectation of employment was irrelevant.
119. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 516 (1980).
120. Id. n. 11.
121. Id. at 517.
122. Id.
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his beliefs.123 This freedom of political belief, the Court con-
cluded, could be validly curtailed only on a governmental dem-
onstration of "'an overriding interest' . . . 'of vital impor-
tance,' "1124 which can only arise from the nature of the public
employee's work. Branti alleged that several state interests were
served by using patronage to employ public attorneys. 25 The
Court concluded that these interests were not of sufficient mag-
nitude to warrant limitation of a First Amendment freedom.
Petitioner's fourth argument claimed that even if Elrod did
apply to the facts at issue, the Court should reverse the district
court's determination that respondents were nonconfidential and
nonpolicymaking employees. " Justice Stevens said the correct
inquiry was not whether an employee was a policymaker or con-
fidential; rather the appropriate test was to determine if "party
membership was essential to the discharge of the employee's
governmental responsibilities.' 2 7 The Court noted that certain
positions could be subject to politically motivated discharge
even though neither confidential nor policymaking in charac-
ter.1 8 While the Court chose not to attempt a redefinition of
policymaking and confidentiality, it did determine that respon-
dents did not make policy concerning partisan political inter-
ests129 nor were they in receipt of confidential political informa-
tion. The policymaking which occurred and confidential
relations that arose related entirely to individual clients. Relying
on his comments in Ferri v. Ackerman,30 Justice Stevens con-
123. Id. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
124. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347, 368, 362 (1976)).
125. Branti asserted that three compelling state interests were advanced by political
appointment of attorneys. First, patronage provides attorneys with an entry into the po-
litical system; second, it gives those attorneys governmental training; and third, it pro-
vides political parties with a method of recruiting and training future elective officials.
These interests in concert, Branti claimed, improve the effectiveness of government.
Brief for Petitioner, at 5.
126. Id.
127. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
128. Id. Justice Stevens used a precinct election judge as an example. A judge could
be dismissed for changing party registration if the State's election laws required that
precincts be supervised by election judges of different parties.
129. Id. at 519.
130. 444 U.S. 193 (1980).
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cluded that partisan political concerns would hinder an assistant
public defender's performance.
In sum, in determining whether a position was subject to
politically motivated discharge, the Court turned the focus away
from categorizing a position as confidential or policymaking. In-
stead, the Court held that the inquiry should center on how
party membership related to job performance.
B. The Dissents
Justice Stewart,"1 ' in dissent, asserted that the Elrod in-
quiry into policymaking and confidentiality should not be dis-
carded. In his judgment, respondents were clearly confidential
employees and thus not protected by Elrod. Analogizing the
public defenders office to a private law firm, Justice Stewart
concluded that the relation between public defender and assis-
tant was by definition a confidential association. Accordingly,
Stewart could find no justification for compelling Branti to asso-
ciate with respondents if he did not wish to do so.1"2
Justice Powell, in a separate five part dissent,13 decried the
continued evisceration of patronage, a practice, in his view, fun-
damental to the interests of the United States. He concluded
that the majority opinion, in effect, mandated a "constitutional-
ized civil service standard."1 3 4
The first section of Powell's dissent criticized the majority
on two separate grounds. Preliminarily, he accused the Court of
largely ignoring the "substantial governmental interests served
[Tihe primary office performed by appointed counsel parallels the office of
privately retained counsel. Although it is true that appointed counsel serves pur-
suant to statutory authorization and in furtherance of the federal interest in in-
suring effective representation of criminal defendants, his duty is not to the public
at large, except in that general way. His principal responsibility is to serve the
undivided interests of his client. Indeed, an indispensable element of the effective
performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the Gov-
ernment and to oppose it in adversary litigation.
Id. at 204.
131. Justice Stewart had been joined by Justice Blackmun in the Elrod concurring
opinion.
132. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
133. Justice Rehnquist joined in whole; Justice Stewart joined the first part of Jus-
tice Powell's dissent. See note 17 supra.
134. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 521 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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by patronage. 135 Second, he stated that the "standard articu-
lated by the Court is framed in vague and sweeping language
certain to create vast uncertainty.' 86 Though a dissenter in
Elrod, Powell found fault in the majority's abandonment of the
nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential limitations on patronage
dismissals. He believed that in Elrod the Court at least recog-
nized a limited role for patronage. Under the new standards,
Powell alleged, elected and appointed officials would no longer
know when political affiliation is an appropriate employment
criterion.13'
Justice Powell alleged that the vagueness of the new stan-
dard would result in burdening the federal courts with
thousands of employment decisions. He predicted that
"[flederal judges will now be the final arbiters as to who federal,
state, and local governments may employ."13 8
The second section of Powell's dissent attacked the Court's
legal basis for its decision by questioning its choice of precedent.
The Court relied on Board of Education v. Barnette,19
Keyshian v. Board of Regents,'4 0 and Perry v. Sindermann,'4
all of which ostensibly had nothing to do with political pa-
tronage. According to Powell, the constitutionality of patronage
cases cannot be determined without balancing the governmental
interests served by patronage against the resultant burden of
First Amendment rights. With the exception of Elrod, none of
the cases cited by the majority dealt with patronage. Accord-
135. Id. at 522 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell discussed this argument in
detail in parts III and IV of his dissent.
136. Id. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 524-25 (Powell, J., dissenting). As an example, he cited the removal and
appointment of United States Attorneys. Though the Attorney General should be confi-
dent in the loyalty of employees, and political affiliation has been used as an indicator of
loyalty, Powell concluded that membership in a particular party could not be regarded as
essential to effective performance of the duties of a United States Attorney. Thus, ac-
cording to Powell, under the majority's standard, such positions could not be filled
through the operation of patronage.
138. Id. at 525 (Powell, J., dissenting).
139. West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Bar-
nette case concerned religious freedom.
140. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
141. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra. The Keyshian and Perry cases
involved freedom of speech in academic settings and teachers' rights to remain in their
positions.
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ingly, Powell claimed that it was improper to resolve a patronage
issue "by reference to First Amendment cases in which pa-
tronage was neither involved nor discussed. '142
In the third part of his dissent, Justice Powell described the
governmental interests served by patronage. First, he alleged
that patronage appointments help build strong political parties.
Through the use of such rewards, party loyalty and organization
is enhanced while factionalism is minimized.143 Second, he
claimed that strong party organization helps political candidates
raise the funds needed to capture the voters' attention, thereby
improving the quality of public debate. 44 Powell predicted that
the Court's decision would impede candidates' ability to present
their views to the electorate.
Powell also accused the majority of denigrating national po-
litical parties. He forecast that party discipline would break
down as a result of the curtailment of patronage. This in turn
would lead to a decline in candidate accountability and enhance
the influence of special interest groups. 45
Powell contended that the Court did not recognize that ex-
ecutive policy cannot be implemented without nonpolicymaking
employees' cooperation. Justice Powell summed up this argu-
ment saying, "'No matter how wise the chief, he has to have the
right Indians to transform his ideas into action, to get the job
done.' "146
The dissent's fourth argument criticized the Court's opinion
as producing an antidemocratic effect. According to Powell, the
voters of Rockland County delegated to their chosen legislature
the power to appoint a public defender, 47 to whom in turn was
delegated the power to select and appoint assistants. These vot-
ers, while free to elect both the public defender and his assist-
ants, chose not to do so. Instead, Powell claimed, the electorate
142. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 527 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 527-28 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 528-29 (Powell, J., dissenting); cf., N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
145. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 532 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 530 (Powell, J., dissenting)(quoting Peters, A Kind Word for the Spoils
System, THE WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1976, at 30).
147. Id. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting). N.Y. CouNTv LAW § 716 (McKinney 1972)
created the office of public defender. The public defender may appoint assistant attor-
neys, clerks, investigators, stenographers and other employees as he may deem necessary.
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chose a system which involved the selection of certain public
employees on the basis of political affiliation. Thus, the Court's
decision limited the voters' ability to structure their county gov-
ernment as they wished. 1 8
The last point of Powell's dissent questioned the propriety
of judicial action in patronage cases. He believed that any deci-
sion to confer civil service status on governmental positions
should be left to the voters and their elected representatives.
Powell concluded that the Court's holding had the result of re-
placing "political responsibility with judicial fiat. 1 49
IV. Analysis
A. The Majority
The Court's decision in Branti reaffirms the principles of
Elrod, but alters the standards for judicial review of the propri-
ety of patronage dismissals. Justice Stevens's opinion, supported
by a majority of the Court, stands as an articulate, but not fault-
less, restatement of the law. The decision answers several ques-
tions left unresolved by Elrod; it fails, however, to provide an
objective standard for determining the level of state interest re-
quired to legitimize patronage.
The Court made clear that inquiry into whether an ag-
grieved former employee had a reasonable expectation of contin-
ued employment is unnecessary.1 50 Patronage cases may be de-
cided without resort to a Perry due process analysis.1 51
Accordingly, employees who obtained jobs through patronage
are nonetheless protected from politically motivated dismissal.
Mere assertion that the beneficiaries of past patronage should
lack any expectation of continued employment when the party
in power shifts will not preclude or defeat such employees' at-
tempts, through legal process, to retain their jobs.
The Branti standards will apply with the same force to
148. Id. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 534 (Powell, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 512 n. 6. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
151. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). While the first part of the Perry
decision dealt with First Amendment rights, see note 48 and accompanying text supra,
the second part dealt with the level of interest required to trigger such due process pro-
tections as pretermination hearings.
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cases dealing with failures to reappoint or rehire. A hiring au-
thority's attempts to distinguish such conduct from dismissals, if
the employment decision is predicated on political beliefs, will
fail.1 52
Justice Stevens rejected attempts to limit Elrod's applica-
tion to actions which infringe directly upon protected political
freedoms. Under Branti, a dismissed employee need not prove
he was subject to blatant coercion to change his political alle-
giance. The Court recognized that indirect infringements can
likewise motivate an employee to compromise his convictions.
An individual deprived of public employment need only estab-
lish that his political beliefs were solely responsible for his
discharge.'15
Like Elrod, the Branti decision acknowledged that a show-
ing of sufficient state interest may override the constitutional
protections afforded political beliefs.15 4 Under Elrod, a govern-
ment could demonstrate such an interest by establishing that
the ex-employee had occupied a policymaking, confidential posi-
tion. Branti shifted the focus from a search for confidential or
policymaking job characteristics, to one in which the govern-
ment must demonstrate that affiliation with a particular party is
necessary for effective job performance. A district court need not
wrestle with the difficult problem of determining if a public of-
fice is policymaking or confidential; it need only decide whether
party membership is essential to the discharge of the public em-
ployee's governmental responsibilities.' 55 The inquiry is factual
and limited to answering the question: must the employee ac-
cede to the politics of a particular party to perform his job
152. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 512 n. 6 (1980). This settles an issue which had
been undecided previously. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra.
153. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980). This decision was clearly warranted,
as the same activity can, simultaneously, infringe directly and indirectly on protected
rights. See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra. Further, there should have been
no question on this issue, as courts respond to indirect and direct infringements with the
same analysis. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
154. Justice Stevens wrote, "First Amendment rights may be required to yield to
the State's vital interest in maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency."
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980).
155. Id. at 518. This avoids the difficult inquiry into the broad nature of the job,
and ends the confusion which stems from the use of "policymaking" and "confidential"
in civil service statutes. See notes 66-67 and text accompanying notes 57-69 supra.
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efficiently?
The Branti majority adequately considered the govern-
ment's interests in formulating the test for valid patronage dis-
missals. A state's primary concern is to ensure the effective per-
formance of each public office. A state's interest is thus
protected by a standard which allows dismissal when political
beliefs interfere with the performance of public office. Such a
standard is the alternative least intrusive on First Amendment
freedoms and is constitutionally justified.
The Branti standard has, apparently, made it more difficult
for the government to establish a need for patronage. A govern-
ment now has the burden of proving that prescribed political be-
liefs are essential to effective job performance. The Court has
implied that governments' claims of essentiality would be
strictly scrutinized. 15" The question remains: what non-civil ser-
vice positions can be subject to patronage, if any?
Justice Stevens gave little guidance on the positions consid-
ered appropriate for patronage. His primary example was a local
election judge, whom the state could legitimately discharge for
changing political parties, if state law required electoral pre-
cincts be supervised by judges of different parties. 157 Justice Ste-
vens also indicated that the essentiality requirement was met for
governors' speech writers, press secretaries and legislative liai-
sons. These individuals, he stated, must share the same political
views as their employers to perform their jobs effectively.1" Jus-
tice Stevens suggested a state university football coach as a posi-
tion not appropriate for patronage, even though the position in-
volves making policy.
Combining Elrod and Branti, ministerial and clerical em-
ployees, football coaches and assistant public defenders cannot
be discharged for solely political reasons. Many more positions,
however, currently staffed through patronage, are directly af-
fected by Branti. Arguably, the ban on patronage firings could
be extended to encompass executive positions as well as public
156. The Court quoted the Elrod plurality, noting that state interests must be
"overriding" and "of vital importance" to legitimize patronage. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 515-16 (1980). Justice Stevens also indicated that the state interest must be "vital."
Id. at 517.
157. Id. at 518.
158. Id.
[Vol. 1:423
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss2/11
BRANTI V. FINKEL
defenders and United States Attorneys. 59
The boundaries of the Branti standard are not yet defined.
If courts apply the decision literally, governments will find it ex-
ceedingly difficult to make legitimate use of the spoils system in
staffing available posts. Governments are now on notice to move
cautiously when making politically motivated employment deci-
sions. If the employer, acting without other cause, believes he
can establish that party membership is critical to proper func-
tioning in a job, he should proceed with the dismissal. If, how-
ever, the employer cannot make that determination, he should
forego the dismissal. Since the issue is primarily one of fact, the
district courts will define the scope of Branti on a case-by-case
basis.
B. The Dissents
In praising the virtues of political patronage, Justice Powell
repeated the arguments raised in his Elrod dissent. He accused
the majority of failing to balance the state interests served by
patronage against the attendant deprivation of First Amend-
ment freedoms. Powell, however, confused partisan interests
with state interests'"a and largely ignored the impact of pa-
tronage on individual rights.
An actual or threatened patronage dismissal imposes a sub-
stantial burden on the affected employee's First Amendment
rights. He can compromise his beliefs and, by so doing, hope to
retain his job, or he can side with his conscience and suffer the
loss of his employment. To leave this person without a remedy is
to deny the basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.
If anything, such coercion has a negative affect on national polit-
ics. A true national commitment to uninhibited, wide-open and
robust political debate161 cannot coexist with inhibition of politi-
cal belief and association through threat of economic loss. The
First Amendment tolerates no such quid pro quo; neither do pa-
159. The Reagan Administration has not yet moved to replace incumbent United
States Attorneys. Deputy Attorney General Ed Schmaltz stated that he does not foresee
problems in this area, but admits that the Justice Department is preparing to address
the issue. Rockland Journal-News, Feb. 23, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
160. See note 40 supra.
161. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tronage appointees waive their First Amendment rights.
The dissent's contention that the majority's decision pro-
duced an antidemocratic result was, similarly, ill-founded. Jus-
tice Powell's assertion was based on the notion that the voters of
Rockland County delegated the power to pick assistants to the
public defender. That power, however, was at all times held by
the local Democratic caucus. 1 2 At best, Branti held a mere veto
power; he could reject a prospective assistant whose name was
submitted by the caucus. Thus, patronage practices had usurped
the democratic process envisioned by Justice Powell.
C. Subsequent Cases
Since the Branti decision was announced on March 31,
1980, several federal courts have applied the decision.83 Their
treatment of Branti runs from conservative application to very
broad interpretation.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Tanner v. McCall,'"
cited Branti in determining that former employees of a sheriff's
department had not been discharged solely for political reasons.
The court regarded Branti as merely reaffirming Elrod with mi-
nor modification and reasoned that Branti rejected only Elrod's
blanket exception for policymakers. According to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, employers need only show that party affiliation is "relevant
or essential" 16 5 to staff a policymaking job through patronage.
This approach largely ignores the language of Branti; the
Fifth Circuit apparently intends to maintain its focus on poli-
cymaking and confidentiality. Further, the court has limited
Branti by allowing patronage on a showing that party affiliation
is merely relevant to a position.
162. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 510 n. 5 (1980).
163. See, e.g., Van Ooteghem v. Gray, 628 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert.
filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1981) (No. 80-1284); Tanner v. McCall, 625 F.2d
1183 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S. Jan. 14, 1981) (No.
80-1227); Farkas v. Thornburgh, 493 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
164. 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3547 (U.S.
Jan. 14, 1981) (No. 80-1227). Plaintiffs were six former employees of a county sheriff's
department who were not reappointed when Sheriff McCall was elected. McCall had con-
ducted interviews with nearly all the former appointees; during those interviews he did
not ask the candidates their political views or whom they had supported in the election.
McCall failed to reappoint only 25% of the former employees. Id. at 1191.
165. Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
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In Farkas v. Thornburgh,' " the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that former
employees of a state agency had not established that their dis-
charge was politically motivated. Under Branti, the court rea-
soned that "the relevant inquiry requires determination of
whether defendant discharged plaintiffs solely because of their
affiliation with the Democratic party .... ,,,11 The court noted
that "[a]lthough Branti did not expressly overrule Elrod, Branti
certainly made unconstitutional dismissals which would have
passed muster under Elrod. ' "
In Mazus v. Pennsylvania Department of Transporta-
tion, ' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether
Elrod principles should be extended to hiring systems. Without
mentioning Branti, the court held that the hiring system at issue
was valid, stating, "The Supreme Court has not considered
whether Elrod applies to patronage hirings as well as firings."' "
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Sloviter reasoned that according to
Elrod and Branti, "[e]mployment decisions based on political
affiliation are themselves of questionable legality."17 1 He con-
cluded that the majority had ignored the policy direction im-
plicit in Branti.
Though no court has yet held that Branti applies to hiring
practices, the Fourth Circuit has determined "that the Elrod-
Branti principle must be construed to provide protection against
a wider range of patronage burdens than threatened or actual
dismissals. '17' In Delong v. United States,178 the court examined
166. 493 F. Supp. 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Plaintiffs were former employees of the
Pennsylvania Department of Revenue. The court decided against them and found that
several valid reasons existed for their discharge. See Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,
429 U.S. 274 (1977). For a discussion of Mt. Healthy, see notes 50-52 and accompanying
text supra.
167. Farkas v. Thornburgh, 493 F. Supp. 1168, 1173 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
168. Id. at 1179 n. 23. The court, in dicta, speculated on whether Branti should be
given retroactive effect, and concluded that justice required only a prospective applica-
tion of Branti. Id.
169. 629 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of sex
discrimination because defendants had not offered her a job as a roadworker.
170. Id. at 873.
171. Id. at 880 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
172. Delong v. United States, 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980). Delong was a state direc-
tor of the Farmers Home Administration in Maine and a Republican. After the change in
national government in 1977, he was ordered back to Washington. Delong alleged that
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whether an undesirable transfer was prohibited by Elrod and
Branti. The court reasoned that certain burdensome transfers
could be equivalent to dismissals. The court noted that if "the
challenged reassignment and transfer can reasonably be thought
to have imposed so unfair a choice between continued employ-
ment and the exercise of protected beliefs and associations, [it
is] tantamount to the choice imposed by threatened
dismissal. 174
Certainly, Branti will eventually encompass the entire scope
of public employment administration, including hirings, and
transfers. The majority of the Supreme Court has agreed that
patronage is constitutional only when the "hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the effective performance of the public office involved.' 1 75
The Court's use of the term "hiring" must be considered more
than gratuitous.
The Court's opinion requires lower courts to determine if
party affiliation is necessary to proper job functioning. If the
propriety of patronage is determined by job responsibilities, it
matters little whether the issue is obtaining or maintaining the
post. In both circumstances, economic coercion is used to further
purely partisan interests. The burden on the First Amendment
in either situation is essentially unchanged.
V. Conclusion
Use of political patronage to staff governmental positions is
contrary to the Constitution, unless political affiliation is essen-
tial to the performance of the public office in question. If affilia-
tion to a particular party is an appropriate prerequisite to em-
his new assignment had no responsibility, required him to do petty jobs, and forced him
to travel excessively. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case for determination of the
level of burden imposed by Delong's transfer.
This case arose from the group of employment decisions that spawned Committee to
Protect the First Amend. Rights of Employees of the Dep't of Agriculture v. Bergland,
626 F.2d 875 (D.C.C. 1979), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 3012 (1980) and John-
son v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1978). See notes 64-67 and accompanying text
supra.
173. 621 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 1980).
174. Id. at 624.
175. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)(emphasis added).
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ployment, valid state interests will be present which will
outweigh the attendant burdens on individuals' First Amend-
ment rights. Labeling positions policymaking or confidential is
no longer a relevant pursuit in patronage cases.
While Branti v. Finkel does not mark the abolition of the
patronage system, it represents a significant curtailment of the
practice. The extent of the proscription remains to be deter-
mined, and lower courts still have some latitude in resolving
these issues. Clearly, however, much truth has been taken from
the adage, "To the victors belong the spoils of the enemy!' 7' 6
Barry P. Biggar
176. William Learned Marcy, in a speech to the United States Senate, January,
1832.
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